Anti-Catholicism and the politics of persuasion in Northern Ireland

Lee Smithey

Issue 355, vol.89, Autumn 2000

In this article, I draw on Brewer and Higgins’ assessment of the way in which some Protestant ideologies have promoted zero-sum mentalities with regard to conflict. I argue that there has recently been a shift, albeit partial and temporary, away from such mentalities. The substantial progress made in the last year toward political inclusion indicates a potential for mutually acceptable compromises, one that deserves scholarly attention.

The division between Protestants and Catholics that Brewer and Higgins present in their book is obviously not one that will dissolve easily in Northern Ireland. However, in identifying four modes of anti-Catholicism, the authors show that anti-Catholicism varies with regard to content. I argue that the "secular mode" is less intransigent than the "covenantal mode", and recent strategic choices by Protestant leaders, particularly in the Orange Order, represent a shift by some Protestant political organizations away from zero-sum anti-Catholic mentalities.

Evidence suggests a growing awareness in political Unionism and loyalism that the success of their causes increasingly lies in their ability to compromise and win public favour. As the era of Protestant privilege fades, Protestant leaders are finding it necessary to present their agendas in more persuasive ways. Consequently, some Protestant leaders and organizations are making efforts to use "constructive" methods that rely on persuasion or reward as opposed to coercion (Kriesberg 1998). At the root of this shift in methods lies another shift: zero-sum mentalities are less relevant in this new political environment. Even in the "No" camps where zero-sum mentalities are strong, organizations such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Orange Order seem to be experimenting with a shift away from those mentalities.

Brewer and Higgins (1998) present a system for classifying various manifestations of anti-Catholicism. They offer four modes: "covenantal", "secular", "Pharisaic", and "passive" . Placed in a two-by-two table, with one axis representing political content and another representing theological, one mode falls into each cell of the table.

I am primarily concerned here with the covenantal and secular modes because they have high levels of political content. The covenantal mode of anti-Catholicism has high theological content and a fundamentalist view that emphasizes the scriptural and divinely sanctioned relationship between Ulster and Protestants. Covenantal Protestants see Northern Ireland geographically and politically as a divinely promised land based on a covenant with God. The covenant, like those in the Old Testament, is upheld through the righteousness and loyalty of God’s people. For covenantal Protestants, loyalty is based on allegiance to union with Britain and a scathing doctrinal critique of Roman Catholicism that hearkens back to the Reformation. Loyalty is further judged against continuity with tradition, literal interpretation of the Bible, and a historical view of Ireland that uses the rhetoric of the anti-Christ, spiritual warfare, and apocalyptic prophecy (Brewer and Higgins 1998).

The secular mode of anti-Catholicism shares allegiance to Britain with the covenantal mode but jettisons the theological content. While the language of "Protestant" and "Catholic" is still used, these terms represent a political distinction as opposed to a theological one. Prejudice toward Catholics in this mode is a function of a fear of violent Republicanism or a fear of unity with a deprived and backward Irish Republic. Catholics are guilty not by their religious affiliation but merely by their association with Nationalism and Republicanism (Brewer and Higgins 1998).

As Brewer and Higgins point out, the religious labels of Protestant and Catholic have persisted because they have most effectively stood for a cadre of other divisions. Thus, "Protestant" and "Catholic" have come to represent opposite poles of a multifaceted conflict (see Dunn 1995). The notion of anti-Catholicism is a central element of what it means for many to be Protestant. This is a core identity for such people. That is, their sense of self is closely related to their social identity as Protestants (Northrup 1992). Identity can also be defined in negative terms: anti-Catholicism serves as a negative image of Protestantism for some Protestants.

One important difference between the covenantal and secular modes of anti-Catholicism is the extent to which they promote zero-sum mentalities, the conviction that any gain by one side can only be had at the expense of the other side. This conviction can be especially strong when conflict is waged over issues that have become central to a group’s identity and its ontological sense of purpose (Northrup 1989). When the cause for which one struggles is objectified in the form of theological claims or civil-religious terms that are central to one’s understanding of oneself and the world, one may more easily feel justified in the use of violent or coercive means of conflict (Simmel 1971 [1908]:87). One is compelled to practise psychological self defense.

The relationship between core identities and zero-sum conflicts lies in the fact that identities are difficult to measure, and that they are, in a phenomenological sense, inextricably linked to one’s very existence. They cannot be negotiated in the way material resources such as territory or government policy can be negotiated (Northrup 1997). The ontological assumptions that make up core identities also limit the range of possible beliefs and actions that a group can undertake (Hunter 1989; Northrup 1989). Thus, in "intractable conflict" (Kriesberg et al. 1989) threat heightens identity, and groups are more likely to use harmful measures to protect their ontological security (Northrup 1997; Tajfel 1981; Wadell and Cairns 1986). In Northern Ireland, some forms of Protestantism are core identities. Brewer and Higgins have approached them through the lens of anti-Catholicism. Here, I am focusing on the covenantal and secular modes of anti-Catholicism, each of which involves zero-sum mentalities.

There is a qualitative difference between the covenantal and secular modes of anti-Catholicism that makes the secular mode less intransigent than the covenantal. Political success is crucial to both modes, but the secular is not constrained by Reformation theology and doctrine like the covenantal mode:

…anti-Catholicism comes with its own immutable and in-built legitimation (God’s scriptural injunction to oppose doctrinal error), which has a special cultural sanction in Northern Ireland because of the society’s high religiosity. This seamlessness becomes a constraint for those people and groups which seek to move beyond sectarian politics. (Brewer and Higgins 1998:211).

Alternatively, secular Protestants are more likely to recognize the importance of their relationships with other parties and constituencies, such as Britain.

It is important to remember that Brewer and Higgins’ modes of anti-Catholicism are ideal types. They are useful for analysis but are not meant to correspond exactly with the empirical world. While Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) constitute the real-world epitome of the ideal type of covenantal anti-Catholicism, even their politics are not entirely covenantal. One of the paradoxes of Ian Paisley is his ability to maintain his religious fundamentalism and at the same time remain politically viable. He is able to do this in part because his theological beliefs and their political interpretations are attractive to a sizeable constituency in Northern Ireland. However, the DUP is also able to bend covenantal principles allowing it to carry on limited relationships with Catholics. The televised images of Ian Paisley sitting in the same chamber at Stormont with Sinn Féin and SDLP assembly members provide one striking example. Paisley also has a favourable reputation among many of his Catholic constituents despite his anti-Catholic rhetoric.

Thus, covenantal Protestants appear able to suspend fundamental beliefs under certain circumstances . As an ideal type, however, covenantal anti-Catholicism tends to lock its practitioners into zero-sum mentalities (Brewer and Higgins 1998:211). The same can be true for secular Protestants, but since secular identities are based on ethnic sentiments, they are more closely related to political realities. It is in the political realm that we can see a shift, albeit slight, away from zero-sum mentalities.

Increasingly, anti-Catholicism is not likely to play well to third parties such as business interests and audiences in the United States and European states. Furthermore, it does not play well to a slowly secularizing Northern Ireland. Protestant political organizations are consequently being forced to shed the image of the media-inept politician (Dunn and Morgan 1994: 16-17) and adapt their strategies. There appears to be an awareness among Protestant political parties and organizations, such as the Orange Order, that they can no longer depend entirely on their position in Ulster as a privileged majority (Dunn and Morgan 1994:10). Instead, they must present themselves in more tolerant ways. They must appear as if they are at least occasionally willing to entertain the possibility of compromise, build coalitions, and negotiate over conflict issues. In other words, changes in the political environment have encouraged some political Protestant organizations to modify their tactics.

Louis Kriesberg (1998) categorizes conflict along three poles that indicate the tactics or "inducements" used by parties to a conflict. Coercive inducements are designed to intimidate an adversary, violently or non-violently. Such inducements are more likely than others to deepen and prolong conflict. Reward and techniques of persuasion are designed to coax an opponent into conflict resolution or persuade the opponent to re-define the nature of the conflict. I argue that the latter techniques are being used by Protestant political organizations, even those that have been linked with covenantal anti-Catholicism. In particular, organizations are becoming more adept at using the media to present a less intransigent image to domestic and international audiences.

There is either a shift toward the secular mode of anti-Catholicism or perhaps a thaw in covenantal anti-Catholicism. In either case, a willingness to use persuasion and reward corresponds with less zero-sum attitudes. The use of persuasion as a political method implies willingness at some level to communicate and interact with Catholics over conflict issues. It also suggests a willingness to suspend temporarily fundamental beliefs in order to perpetuate dialogue and thus project a positive image to one’s opponent and third parties .

To demonstrate this shift, consider the response of one particular covenantal Protestant organization, the Orange Order. Brewer and Higgins do not classify the Orange Order in one mode or the other. However, the argument can be made that the Order is a covenantal organization. The April 2000 issue of The Orange Standard contains a brief article titled "Standing Firm for the Reformed Faith": "We have made the point time and time again that the basis of Orangeism is commitment to the Protestantism of Reformed Christianity and that the practice of that faith is a primary duty of Orangemen." There is little or no reference to Catholicism in materials publicly available on the Grand Lodge website and the "Basis of the Institution" states that the Orange Order "will not admit into its brotherhood persons whom an intolerant spirit leads to persecute, injure or upbraid any man on account of his religious opinions." (Education Committee of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland 1997:4).

Yet, the oath of membership binds Orangemen to oppose Catholicism and will not legitimize Catholicism by allowing Orangemen to attend a Catholic service. The emphasis on Reformed Christianity also implies the exclusion of the Catholic faith. High profile Orangemen upbraid the institution of the Catholic Church, and there are instances in which criticism is directed at individuals. In 1997, Robert Saulters, the newly elected Grand Master of the Orange Order, accused Tony Blair of disloyalty because he married a "Romanist" (Elliott and Flackes 1999:432). Brewer and Higgins have also shown that the Orange Order has been mobilized in defense of Protestant privilege. Despite the Orange Order’s rhetoric regarding tolerance (and many Orangemen are certainly tolerant individuals), the Order’s emphasis on Reformation theology and its commitment to "defend the faith" place it in the covenantal mode of anti-Catholicism in a way that other secular Protestant organizations, such as the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), do not fit.

Despite its covenantal nature, the Orange Order now finds it necessary to resort to persuasive methods. One of my Catholic respondents expressed it this way:

The Orange Order’s trying a new tack. The Orange Order always had this [approach to the] media, ‘We do this because we, well basically, regarding Ulster, it’s our country. We can do what we want.’ . . . And now I think they are thinking more, well, the government and the police aren’t ours any more. We have to compromise and talk to these people . . . They’re all seeing . . . that Northern Ireland isn’t just on its own any more. It’s part of a bigger picture.

This shift in mentality manifested itself in Portadown over the July 12^th season. Harold Gracey, the District Master of Portadown District Lodge, has been encamped at Drumcree Church of Ireland since July 1998 insisting that they be allowed to march through the primarily Catholic Garvaghy Road area. For the past five summers, security forces, Orangemen and loyalists have faced off across security barriers. Violence has often erupted, and the deaths of three Catholic children in an arson attack in 1998 were widely associated with the unrest at Drumcree. An officer in the Royal Ulster Constabulary was also killed in September of 1998. However, Orange leaders made a crucial strategic decision during the summer of 1999. Instead of leading the mass of Orangemen down to the police barriers, a small contingent of representatives walked to the security gate, offered a letter of protest, and walked back up to the church grounds where a rally was held behind the church. At the rally, Harold Gracey pledged to leave his encampment on the hill if the current situation turned violent. Though some Orangemen were disappointed, these decisions defused the situation and prevented the usual spread of unrest across Northern Ireland. To the surprise of almost everyone, the summer passed relatively peacefully.

Similarly, Orange representatives held a symbolic action during a church parade in the town of Kilkeel on August 15, 1999. The action involved David Jones, spokesman for the Portadown Orange Lodge, and John Finlay, an Orangeman from Dunloy where Orange parading had been blocked by the Parades Commission. The representatives stood in a line across the road and then stepped to the pavement as the bands approached in order to welcome them through the town. The gesture was meant to communicate a question: if a Catholic parade can proceed peacefully through a Protestant town why can Orange parades across Northern Ireland not be allowed through predominantly Catholic areas? Other protesters had been asked to stay away in favour of this method, and the day passed in a peaceful manner. One local paper reported on the event with the headline: "Peaceful Kilkeel Has Answer to Parades". Another reported the headline "Good Sense Wins Day in Kilkeel" When I asked one Orangeman and DUP activist about the event in Kilkeel, he responded:

I’ll be honest with you. It’s something that the Protestant people should have been doing thirty years ago. I’ll be the first to admit this, and I’m sure you’ll agree with me. The Protestant people have always been reactionary rather than proactive. If anything happens:- reactive – bang, out in the streets, block the roads, that’s the way we’ll settle this. Whereas the way the Republicans have done it, they have been working on a thirty-year strategy.

Other respondents in my research also commented on Protestants’ relative inexperience with the politics of persuasion. However, the events at Drumcree and Kilkeel in 1999 suggest an effort to diversify Protestants’ conflict skills. These choreographed conflict events indicate a move away from zero-sum mentalities. They signal a less defensive stance.

I also acknowledge the limitations of this claim. In a society as divided as Northern Ireland, persuasive techniques will be used along with coercive ones and will often be interpreted as coercive. Some will argue that the decisions at Drumcree were not entirely sincere but were only used when promises were made behind closed doors to allow the Orangemen down the road at a later date. Thus, the choreographed protest by Orange leaders at Drumcree was only one part of an agenda to ensure that the Order was eventually allowed to walk. Also, regardless of the persuasive nature of the event, the Orange agenda remains offensive to most Nationalists. Others will argue that the restraint of Orangemen at Drumcree was only effective because it was enforced through physical threat from loyalist paramilitaries. Some have suggested that methods such as the one used in Kilkeel are merely substitutes for mass protests when sufficient numbers of protesters cannot be mustered. These arguments are not unexpected; coercive and persuasive methods are often used in conjunction with one another. Methods such as those used at Drumcree are also likely to be interpreted in negative ways because the usual discourses of mistrust still prevail.

Just because the Orange Order and other Protestant organizations have been willing to experiment with creative and persuasive methods does not mean that the trend will continue in the near future. David Jones, the spokesman for Portadown Orange Lodge, has recently been quoted in the Belfast Telegraph saying:

That strategy that was adopted last year would not be able to be adopted this year . . . That was designed to give the Prime Minister and government a bit of breathing space. But neither the government nor the Garvaghy Road residents made any move towards resolving this. Now people won’t allow them a bit of breathing space. Whatever happens in the year 2000, I don’t believe we are going to have the option of getting away with doing what we did in 1999 (Thornton 2000).

As the May 22, 2000 deadline for decommissioning approaches under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, it has looked increasingly unlikely that the assembly at Stormont will be re-established. The current deadlocks over decommissioning and the future of the Royal Ulster Constabulary are zero-sum conflicts of the highest magnitude. Yet, at the time of writing this article, the British and Irish governments have announced that the Assembly at Stormont will be resumed on May 22, 2000.

Brewer and Higgins’ book provides a useful schema for understanding how Protestant identity has been used in the defence of Protestant politics and privilege. They have argued that the discursive formations, the language and articulation of anti-Catholicism not only describe Catholics but also influence the way Protestants perceive Catholics. Conversely, anti-Catholicism is also often fundamental to the way Protestants perceive themselves. I have argued that anti-Catholicism is related to zero-sum mentalities because it is a basic element of some Protestant identities that are perceived to be under threat.

However, identity is not entirely static and is often modified, particularly in conflict situations (Kane 1997; Mach 1993). Despite the rigid nature of identities and the roles they play in intractable conflicts, they are also flexible. Core identities can be incrementally transformed. They may alter for various reasons such as changes in the nature or means of a conflict, the influence of third parties, and external events like a new common enemy. In other words, identity can change as social contexts change, and we should not be surprised to see changes in Protestant identity and anti-Catholicism (Northrup 1989:67; Waddell and Cairns 1986).

Brewer and Higgins have demonstrated the role that both covenantal and secular forms of anti-Catholicism have played in enforcing division in Northern Ireland. Zero-sum mentalities that accompany anti-Catholicism tend to directly or indirectly promote coercive conflict methods such as economic and political discrimination, boycotts, and paramilitarism. However, some evidence suggests a new willingness among covenantal and secular Protestants to begin to shed zero-sum mentalities and experiment with persuasive conflict methods.

Some will argue that this phenomenon is limited and probably temporary, and this may be true. Already, many citizens who voted for the Good Friday Agreement have switched over to anti-agreement camp. The current divisions between pro-agreement and anti-agreement camps represent the battle over the discourse on Protestant identity and the proper methods for perpetuating Protestant culture in Northern Ireland. The anti-Catholic discursive formations described by Brewer and Higgins may supersede newer formations that recognize the need to appeal to Catholics and other audiences through persuasive conflict methods.

However, it is also difficult to ignore the impressive progress made over the past couple of years and the role of Protestant political organizations in the process. Here, I have focused on choices made by the Orange Order. The decisions made to scale-down the protest at Drumcree in the summer of 1999 had an enormous effect on communities across Northern Ireland. The strategy did offer "breathing space" during which time the negotiations at Stormont could continue, leading to devolution on December 2, 1999. Over time, the use of persuasive methods by Protestant political organizations may incrementally transform the anti-Catholic discursive formations that perpetuate intractable conflict in Northern Ireland.

Lee Smithey lectures on Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin.

*I offer special thanks to Joel Dark and Anne Kane who provided valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this paper.