The Nice Treaty and the Irish Referendum
What Values are at Stake?

Some ascribed the referendum rejection to disenchantment with the prospect of a Europe where Ireland, for a change, should soon have to become a contributor to the EU budget (in the context of those less prosperous nations now wishing to join the Union). Yet in the same post-referendum survey, only 15% of Irish people declared themselves negative towards EU ‘enlargement’. In any case, certain major stipulations of the Nice Treaty would have come into effect even had no enlargement been contemplated. (It was stated, further, that enlargement was possible under existing EU law). So reasons for the negative Irish stance must be sought elsewhere.

Irish fears clustered around the threat to values like national sovereignty - emanating from what was perceived to be a supranational state-in-the-making. Irish ideological positions ranged across the spectrum from doctrinaire nationalism to anti-globalization advocacy.

Misgivings focussed strongly on the question of neutrality in the context of the defence and security aspects of the treaty: 40% in the post-referendum survey favoured the strengthening of Irish neutrality. Especially critical were those who believed that European proponents of the treaty had been less than upfront, having neglected to include all relevant issues in the treaty itself or in treaty protocols - and having opted instead to relegate issues to less clear-cut instruments such as a ‘Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy’, a Presidency report on the latter, and ‘Annexes’ on the military capabilities of the European Rapid Reaction Force and on relationships with NATO. (Also deemed questionable was the classified status accorded EU documents relating to or referring to NATO). Nor was confidence any greater in the Irish government's transparency regarding the issue of our participation in NATO's ‘partnership for peace’.

Other treaty proposals alienating many voters were those aimed at effecting a two-tier structure in the EU. The Treaty Of Amsterdam had already initiated provisions whereby a self-selected sub-set of member-states could begin to strive for deeper integration among themselves. Certain Nice Treaty measures further facilitated such a move, by removing the necessity for a majority vote of member-states and by circumscribing the power of the veto. The general thrust of any such development - characterised by Jacques Delors as ‘a Federation for the avant-garde’ - was seen by critics as dividing into first-class and second-class citizens what should always remain a Union of legal equals.

Allied to these anxieties were concerns about treaty measures considered to be subversive of the principle of ‘one nation, one vote’:- The votes in the Council Of Ministers were to be re-weighted in favour of the larger states; a qualified majority vote could more often be the norm in the Council; changes were adumbrated in the definition of Council ‘legitimate majority’ and ‘blocking minority’; not every member-state (of an eventual 27) was always to have a Commissioner; the powers of the Commission's President were to be increased.

Such, broadly speaking, were the categories into which the issue-based objections fell. But the Irish electorate also experienced an information deficit with regard to referendum questions. A survey by the European Commission Representation in Ireland found that 63% of the electorate had only a vague idea of treaty issues. Some of this was due to the lack of transparency (already mentioned) at the European source of certain treaty proposals - with legal opinion being also divided, for instance, on what exactly was involved in treaty provisions regarding the ‘flexibility’ allowed to any self-selecting countries opting for ‘enhanced cooperation’.

Eithne Murphy is College Lecturer in the Department of Economics, NUI, Galway.